Abstract: Th e incentive for contributing this paper is the planned great reform of Polish Special Services. Th e study attempts to formulate some requirements that should be met by disciplinary procedure. Th is goal is achieved by analyzing the eff ective disciplinary procedure in the Internal Security Agency (ABW), the largest branch of Polish Special Services, in the prism of the concept of a fair trial. Th e assessment of the disciplinary procedure in ABW leads to the conclusion that the eff ective law has many shortcomings. Major drawbacks are a lack of establishment of the supreme rule of disciplinary procedure and lack of a clear defi nition in the application of the general rules of criminal law within the domain of disciplinary procedure. Th e paper concludes that the shortfalls illustrated herein should be eliminated as fast as possible in order to adjust the disciplinary regime to modern standards.
Special services are specifi c institutions in a democratic state. Th e nature and burden of tasks special services are entrusted with empowers them with several rights whose exercise implies signifi cant interference in the civil rights and freedoms. At the same time, statutorily determined tasks of special services entail that offi cers on duty encounter the most dangerous manifestations of crime, very oft en supported by organized crime groups, and sometimes (as in the case of spying) even foreign and hostile countries. Th e above facts imply that fulfi lling operational, reconnaissance and procedural activities, offi cers of special services are subject to extremely intense and diverse pressure. In extreme cases such pressure may lead to the breach of their offi cial oath and eventually result in the violation of law, improper performance of their duties or conduct contrary to the professional ethics.
Th e above mentioned circumstances imply that maintenance of discipline and respect of the law by special services offi cers are of incredibly considerable importance. One of the basic mechanisms assuring the observance of the rule of law within the sphere of special services are provisions creating the system of disciplinary liability 1 . Disciplinary norms must be formulated in a way which will make the ensuing model of liability an effi cient and eff ective mechanism strengthening the rule of law in the operation of special services. At the same time, the envisaged solutions must respect general principles in force in a democratic state of law.
Th e media have recently informed about the plan of a profound reform of special services 2 . For this reason, it appears necessary to analyze valid disciplinary provisions referring to the largest special service unit, i.e. Internal Security Agency (hereinaft er ABW). A purpose of the analysis is to draw attention to the existing imperfections of the current system of disciplinary procedure so that these fl aws could be eliminated from the provisions on new services.
In the current legal status, disciplinary liability referring to ABW has been specifi ed in Chapter 10 of the Act of 24 May 2002 on the Internal Security Agency and Intelligence Service Due to the functions and powers exercised by the special services, the issue of control over these institutions is an issue of particular importance in a democratic state of law. Th e model of controlof of special services that are currently in force in Poland is a multi-entity and multidimensional system. Th e control competencies over the operational and procedural activities of special services were entrusted to various entities that perform their activities in the fi eld of diff erent aspects of the activities of special services. Some control entities and their mechanisms are internal and located within a given service -undoubtedly this is a character of a system of disciplinary responsibility. More about the control of special services: A. Taracha the fi rst requirement that should be considered in the provisions on the new special service is a postulate to abolish regulation of the issues concerning disciplinary liability in the sub-statutory act 5 . Th e legitimacy of statutory regulation of disciplinary law is supported by the fact that even though the disciplinary system does not create a strictly criminal liability, it indeed completes and strengthens it in a specifi c way confi rming the circumstance that punishment is not limited to the sphere of the state criminal law 6 . Disciplinary liability is by all means repressive liability
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. Disciplinary provisions undeniably impose specifi c burdens on the persons involved, which may result in the restriction of civil rights and freedoms. Due to their severity, some disciplinary sanctions considerably surpass discomfort or pain of penalties and penal measures envisaged in the Criminal Code 8 . At the same time, in a democratic state of law, each normative regulation which permits interference in the civil rights and freedoms must have a status of an Act. It is explicitly and unanimously stipulated in Art. 31 par. 1 of the Constitution, according to which any limitation upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights may be imposed only by statute.
Another problem ensuing from the valid disciplinary provisions referring to ABW is a lack of the supreme principle establishing the ABW offi cers' disciplinary liability. Th e fact that no structural principle of disciplinary law has been contained in the provisions on ABW while only prerequisites of this liability On the distinction between the principle of responsibility and its premises, see. A. Brzozowski, M. Safj an, E. Skowrońska-Bocian, Zobowiązania, Warszawa 2004, pp. 206-207. breaking service discipline as well as other cases stipulated in the Act, ensues the question whether disciplinary liability referring to ABW is based on the principle of guilt, or whether it is objectivised liability based on the civil law structures of risk or equity 10 . It should be noticed here that disciplinary liability in uniformed services based directly on the principle of guilt has been enshrined by the Act on the Police 11 , State Fire Service and Prison Service 12 . On the account of the above solutions, a failure to determine in Art. 144 and 145 of the currently valid Act on ABW and AW (Intelligence Agency) the rule establishing disciplinary liability may imply that disciplinary liability of ABW offi cers does not depend on guilt thus bearing a status of objective liability entailing specifi c negative consequences solely on the basis of the existence of a causal connection between human conduct and the ensuing eff ect. Th e conceded justifi cation of the claim according to which disciplinary liability could be based on the objective principle may be found in the intention to aggravate disciplinary provisions, which is motivated by the argument that a nature of threats being combated and assigned tasks whose fulfi lment is of fundamental importance for Poland's security decide about the fact that liability within the ABW structures should be more severe than liability of police offi cers, fi remen or prison service offi cers. Not negating the need for particularly harsh discipline in special services, it should be noticed that the purposively justifi ed interpretation permitting objective attribution to the eff ect within the disciplinary system is absolutely inacceptable for axiological reasons. It has already been mentioned that disciplinary liability is a repressive liability which imposes on liable individuals specifi c burdens that by their very nature enter into the sphere of constitutionally protected rights and freedoms. Th e same as criminal sanctions, interference resulting from the application of the disciplinary system aff ects the most personal rights. Th is fact unequivocally supports subordination of disciplinary liability to the principle of guilt. In the judgment of 19 March 2007 rendered in connection with the restriction of the right to defence, the Constitutional Tribunal 13 unambiguously decided that "Art. 42-45 as well as Art. 78 of the Constitution shall be applied to assess not only strictly criminal regulations but, respectively, also other repressive regulations including disciplinary liability. Similar to criminal proceedings, the legislator is obliged to formulate provisions 10 It should be emphasized that in civil law, in relation to the liability of the ex-tort, the reference to the principles of risk and equity plays a complementary role. Th e guiding principle of the liability regime for tort is the principle of guilt, which is clearly expressed in art. regulating any type of disciplinary proceedings in a manner assuring appropriate level of the right to defence in the substantive and formal aspect" 14 . Referring to the principle of proportionality, the Constitutional Tribunal also noticed in the above mentioned judgment that "with regard to uniformed services (as well as in other cases), limitation of the rights of individuals must be appropriately justifi ed, in other words -it must be proportional". In the face of the invoked judgment, a repressive nature of ABW offi cers' liability decides about the application of guarantees and principles that are fundamental to the entire repressive law, including the principle of guilt, to this liability
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. For this reason, evaluating disciplinary law referring to ABW, it should be claimed that a lack of explicitly regulated structural principle of this liability is by all means a defect of the currently valid Act. Th is evaluation is not changed by the content of Art. 28 par. 1 of the Regulation of Prime Minister of 20 December 2004 determining circumstances that should be taken into account when disciplinary penalty is imposed and restricted without reservation. Th is provision clearly points out to a degree of guilt as one of the circumstances that should be taken into account while imposing disciplinary penalty. Th is solution satisfi es standards of contemporary repressive law assuming that severity of disciplinary penalty should not exceed a degree of guilt. Only punishment proportional to a degree of guilt, including the entire complexity of the situation in which the act ensuing disciplinary liability has been committed, and imposed on the basis of the analysis of all circumstances supporting both aggravation and mitigation of liability may be recognized as fair. However, pointing to guilt as a circumstance that should be taken into account in imposing penalty is not univocal with founding the disciplinary system on the principle of individual liability and culpability, and it is not suffi cient as such. Considering that unambiguity of the principle of guilt as the basis of disciplinary liability in the light of literary, systemic and historical interpretation is not self-evident at all and, at the same time, including the fact that for guarantee reasons, disciplinary liability may only be based on this principle, the issue of the structural principle of disciplinary law should be univocally regulated.
A failure to unambiguously base the disciplinary system referring to ABW on the principle of guilt is naturally connected with a lack of reference to the fundamental principle of contemporary criminal law, i.e. the principle of assumed innocence 16 . Th e principle of assumed innocence is considered to be an immanent element of 14 An identical position regarding the validity under the disciplinary regime of all guarantees provided for in the second chapter of the Contitution was taken by the Constitutional Th e principle of assumed innocence as a standard of the discplinary proceedings was indicated in the disciplinary proceedings applicable for the police, where art. 135g § 2 semtence 1 of the Act a democratic state of law connected with the principle of inalienable and inherent human dignity expressed in Art. 30 of the Polish Constitution. Th e guarantee to be treated as an innocent person has been expressed both in the Polish Constitution and binding acts of international law 17 . It is one of the fundamental principles designating individuals' position in the society and their relations to the authorities. Analyzing the operation of the principle of assumed innocence within the area of disciplinary law, we should pay attention to the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 29 January 2002 18 , according to which "regulation of the principle of assumed innocence in the Constitution among provisions on freedoms and human and civil rights means the extended scope of application of the principle beyond the framework of criminal proceedings".
A failure to specify the principle upon which liability in disciplinary law referring to ABW is based on and, consequently, a failure to include the principle of assumed innocence therein, are derivatives of a general defect of current provisions manifested in a failure to regulate the issue of appropriate application of substantive criminal law regulations in disciplinary proceedings
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. In the judgment of 5 November 2003 20 , analyzing provisions specifying the disciplinary system referring to common court judges, the Supreme Court decided that a lack of univocal regulation of the application of substantive criminal law regulations in disciplinary proceedings is an actual loophole of the legal system which must be fi lled in by interpretative endeavours. In the above invoked judgment, the Supreme Court decided that the application of the principle of accurate response 21 codifi ed in Art. 2 § 1 point 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure within the area of disciplinary law depends on the observance of 6 April 1990 on the Police stipulates that the accused is considered innocent until his guilt is proved and confi rmed by a valid decision. of fundamental principles of criminal law in disciplinary proceedings. According to the Supreme Court, the fulfi lment of the fundamental principle of accurate response, which within the area of disciplinary law takes a form of the principle ordering to hold disciplinary liable only a person who has committed an act ensuing disciplinary liability, requires the observance of basic principles of criminal law. It is also necessary to appropriately apply solutions determining the time when a prohibited act has been committed, the provisions on the form of an act and the form of its commission as well as principles specifying circumstances excluding liability. Being guided by the importance of appropriate application of criminal law provisions within the area of disciplinary law, the Supreme Court indicated a manner of using substantive law regulations in connection with a disciplinary case deciding that "during disciplinary proceedings, solutions envisaged in the Criminal Code should be referred to under the principle of analogia iuris. Obviously, the provisions of substantive criminal law must be appropriately applied in disciplinary proceedings, i.e. they must be: a) applied directly, b) applied with suitable modifi cations, or c) refused to be applied due to specifi c diff erence while particular prudence is necessary" 22 . Th e necessity to apply the provisions of substantive criminal law appropriately in disciplinary proceedings was confi rmed by the Supreme Court in the judgment of 14 July 2009 23 . In this judgment the Supreme Court rightly noticed that the issue of applying the provisions of substantive criminal law in disciplinary proceedings is not self-evident. Considering the guarantee nature of criminal law and structures envisaged therein, a lack of obviousness with regard to the application of these regulations within the area of disciplinary system the Supreme Court has emphasized may entail farreaching, negative consequences. For this reason, new regulations thereon should be unambiguous.
A peculiar derivative of the insuffi cient inclusion of the criminal law structure in disciplinary law referring to ABW is the catalogue of disciplinary penalties contained in Art. 146 of the Act on ABW. Qualifi cation of a warning (caution) of insuffi cient professional suitability to service as the most severe punishment, which is more , declared that the appropriate application of substantive criminal law in the disciplinary proceedings was acceptable and held that "Th ere is no reason to use other interpretations of unintentional guilt for the purposes of disciplinary proceedings against a Police offi cer than that which is set out in criminal law. " Some doubts about this ruling was expressed by D. Korczyński, Wina jako przesłanka…, op. cit., lenient only from the dismissal from service, should be found inadequate. It seems that a much more painful penalty is stripping an offi cer off his rank. Th is penalty is more aggravated than a caution of insuffi cient professional suitability not only in the aspect of honour 24 as it additionally entails more painful fi nancial consequences. Pursuant to the Regulation of Prime Minister of 7 October 2002 on perks (allowances) to ABW offi cers' salaries 25 , the allowance for a Private amounts to PLN 600 whereas the allowance for the lowest rank in the Offi cer Corps, i.e. the allowance for a Second Lieutenant, amounts to PLN 980. With regard to higher ranks, the allowances are still higher. Th e allowance for a Colonel amounts to PLN 1160 whereas Brigadier General receives PLN 1270. At the same time, obtaining an offi cer rank under the ordinary course takes from eight to ten years.
Analyzing disciplinary law referring to ABW in the context of a fair trial, we should also draw attention to one of the fundamental elements of this concept, i.e. the right to eff ective measures of appeal and their exercise within the disciplinary system. Pursuant to § 7 point 2 of the Regulation of Prime Minister of 20 December 2004, ABW Chief Security Offi cer is competent to impose disciplinary penalty involving degradation to a lower rank, caution of insuffi cient professional suitability and the most severe disciplinary penalty -dismissal from service. At the same time, § 32 par. 4 stipulates that one is not entitled to appeal against the decision of ABW Chief Security Offi cer passed in disciplinary proceedings whereas the punished person may only apply for re-examination of his or her case. It should be noticed here that a repressive nature of disciplinary liability ensues that a strictly administrative application for re-examination of the case 26 is not an adequate instrument of the rights protection within the area of disciplinary law. Discussing a profound reform 24 It should be noted that the deprivation of the rank of offi cer is also one of the consequences of imposing a criminal measure in the form of deprivation of public rights, which is a punitive measure pursuant to art. 40 § 2 of the Penal Code and it may be ordered in the event of a sentence of imprisonment for a period not shorter than 3 years for an off ense committed because of an incentive deserving special condemnation. Th e doctrine emphasizes that the penal measure in the form of deprivation of public rights derives from those penalties which resulted in deprivation of legal protection, expulsion, loss of worship and rights. In the Code of 1932, the equivalent of deprivation of public rights were additional penalties in the form of the loss of civil and civic rights of honorary rights. of special services, it is also worth considering postulates 27 reported in the doctrine about transferring disciplinary jurisdiction from administrative courts to common courts, and more absolute (complete) subordination of disciplinary proceedings to the procedural criminal law
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. Th e argument for leaving cases embracing disciplinary liability in the jurisdiction of administrative courts is a formal nature of disciplinary settlement which takes a form of an administrative decision 29 as well as an administrative nature of service relationship 30 arising in the course of appointment (promotion), which is characterized by a considerable degree of subordination and inequality. On the other hand, subordination of disciplinary cases to the jurisdiction of common courts is mainly supported by a repressive nature of disciplinary liability. Taking into account the above mentioned arguments, it should be held that the emphasized purpose of disciplinary proceedings, i.e. imposing a penalty for the committed off ence, seems to be an argument deciding about determination of a proper procedure to resolve a disciplinary case. Even though disciplinary liability stems from a professional (service) administrative relationship, it fi nally becomes self-contained (self-reliant), and due to its focus on penalty, it becomes closer to a criminal law relationship. For this reason, a fi nal decision on disciplinary liability should be made on the basis of the provisions of criminal procedure applied by a common court. Such a solution, including an autonomous nature of disciplinary liability, will permit to resolve disciplinary cases by the use of procedure which is better adjusted to this purpose and assures more guarantees.
Summing up the above presented comments on selected solutions of disciplinary law referring to ABW, which have been inspired by the planned reconstruction of the system of Polish Special Services, it should be held that the regulation of 27 Statements of this content were also submitted during the nationwide conference "Models of the disciplinary proceedings in the light of the principles of a fair trial" organized by the Department of Criminal Proceedings of the Faculty of Law of the University of Białystok on 17 March 2014. 28 S. Maj, Odpowiedzialność dyscyplinarna..., op. cit., p. 41. 29 On the relationship between between the material nature of the case and the mode of its hearing see T. Romer, Właściwość sądów administracyjnych i sądów powszechnych w sprawach z zakresu prawa pracy, (in:) M. Błachucki, T. Górzyńska (eds.), Aktualne problemy rozgraniczania właściwości sądów administracyjnych i sądów powszechnych, Warszawa 2011, p. 59 and 64. 30 Th e view that the nature of a legal relationship is an argument for subjecting disputes arising from this relationship to the appropriate type of proceedings is expressed, inter alia, in: W. Sanetra, Właściwość sądów powszechnych (sądów pracy i ubezpieczeń społecznych) i sądów administracyjnych w sprawach z zakresu ubezpieczeń społecznych, (in:) M. Błachucki, T. Górzyńska (eds.), Aktualne problemy..., op. cit., p. 77. Th e real nature of the dispute in defi ning the proper procedure for its resolution requires to consider also M. Jaśkowska, Konstytucyjno prawne podstawy sądownictwa powszechnego i administracyjnego oraz delimitacja właściwości tych sądów, (in:) M. Błachucki, T. Górzyńska (eds.), Aktualne problemy..., op. cit., p. 26. At this point, it should be noted that following the postulate mentioned above, the Author expresses doubts about subjecting disciplinary matters to the jurisdiction of administrative courts, ibidem, p. 29.
disciplinary system currently operating in ABW is far from being perfect 31 . Due to this, it should be postulated that creating new regulations on special services and establishing disciplinary provisions therein, the legislator should pay more attention to the requirements ensuing from the concept of a fair trial because only appropriate reference to this idea will allow to remove currently existing fl aws of disciplinary law and adapt it to the standards a repressive regulation should satisfy in a democratic state of law.
